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Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Chile (Korry) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

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1. Ref message unfortunately was sent in not quite accurate form due to relay under difficult circumstances. Following is what I had in mind:

2. Because of Anaconda decision and British offer of 4,000,000 pound credit, I see little hope unless economic situation worsens. That could still happen. But in order for it to occur, I need support from Washington that until now has not repeat not been forthcoming in any effective manner.

3. It is puzzling to me to understand how anyone could think that an offer to maintain our MAP Program of a few hundreds of thousands of dollars could be a significant factor while we make no effort to dissuade either the largest U.S. enterprise in the country (Anaconda) or our supposed ally (UK) from taking critical actions to ease Allende into office. It took three weeks for USIA to send a circular asking for material about the encroachments on the freedom of press, by which time the Communists had called off the strong-arm tactics because they recognized that the international furor could hurt Allende. Instead the Allendistas are concentrating on much more subtle methods in every enterprise of any importance in the country, primarily through their Popular Unity electoral apparatus that is very swiftly supplanting the normal union and professional structure.

4. Because I have no optimism about any Army move or any expectation of the biological miracle of transplanting a backbone to the PDC—unless there is economic deterioration—I believe it prudent to have CAS begin moving into a "denied area" stance. This is not to say that I believe "the ball game is over;" it is designed to clarify your thinking and that of a bureaucracy in Washington that appears to be as clear-minded, purposeful and united as the PDC here.

5. It is an absurdity for me to continue to seek by every means to block Allende without U.S. Government support; because man is an absurdity I shall of course continue my efforts since I believe "it is not necessary to hope in order to act or to succeed in order to persevere," but I would appreciate the company of at least a few who shared this absurd view.