DECLASSIFIED // SECRET; EYES ONLY

Memorandum for the Record

Identificador Archival:	frus:frus1969-76v21/d149
Agencia Emisora:	NSC / Casa Blanca
Fecha del Documento:	1970-10-14
Colección / Serie:	FRUS 1969–1976, vol. XXI: Chile, 1969–1973

Nota de Archivo: *Washington. Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile 1970, 40 Committee Minutes. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on October 16. A copy was sent to Mitchell, Packard, Johnson, Moorer, and Helms. A notation at the end of the memorandum states: "re: Committee meeting 10/14/70: Mr. Ray Leddy and Mr. Warren Nutter from DOD/ISA were also present for Item 2 (Chile). They entered the Situation Room during discussion of this item, thinking they were attending the Special Review Group meeting scheduled to follow the 40 Committee meeting. The SRG was to discuss NSSM 97 (Chile)."*

Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 14 October 1970

Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, Admiral Moorer, and General Cushman

Colonel Richard T. Kennedy and Mr. Thomas Karamessines were present for Items 1 and 2.

Mr. John Holdridge and Mr. William Wells were present for Item 1.

Ambassador Edward M. Korry, Mr. Charles A. Meyer, Mr. Viron P. Vaky, and Mr. William Broe were present for Item 2.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

2. Chile

a. The Chairman asked Mr. Karamessines to give a rundown on the latest developments and present situation in Chile. Mr. Karamessines pointed out that because of President Frei's equivocal attitude and signals to his military leaders and Cabinet members there is no pulling together to block Allende's accession to the presidency and a coup climate does not presently exist. He noted that the unpredictable General Viaux is the only individual seemingly ready to attempt a coup and expressed the view that his chances of mounting a successful one were slight.

b. Ambassador Korry agreed that it was unlikely General Viaux could trigger a coup and stated that as of now it seemed almost certain that Allende would be voted into office on October 24th.

c. The Chairman observed that there presently appeared to be little the U.S. can do to influence the Chilean situation one way or another. Those present concurred.

d. Ambassador Korry then offered a proposal for consideration which he had not yet had an opportunity to reduce to writing, but on which timing was most urgent if it were to be implemented. He stated that he had been approached on behalf of a group of Freistas who wished to purchase [less than 1 line not declassified] to use as a political opposition instrument to the Allende administration, assuming Allende's inauguration as scheduled on November 4th. Ambassador Korry described [less than 1 line not declassified] as having not only the [1½ lines not declassified]. He stated that it is now

owned by Alessandristas who are willing to sell it to the group of Frei backers.

e. [less than 1 line not declassified] has a current operating deficit of $10,000 per month, and the Freista purchasers would like a commitment for six months covert U.S. subsidy of this deficit. Ambassador Korry was of the opinion that [less than 1 line not declassified] had a good chance of functioning as an opposition instrument for a six-month period but noted that if it were taken over by Allende prior to that time the monthly deficit subsidy would cease. He stated that there could be some U.S. influence on the [less than 1 line not declassified] output, but no effort should be made to become involved in its actual operation.

f. The Committee agreed this proposal was worth a try and authorized [less than 1 line not declassified] funding in the amount of [dollar amount not declassified] for the six-month period recommended.