DECLASSIFIED // SECRET; NO FOREIGN DISSEM; NO DISSEM ABROAD; CONTROLLED DISSEM; BACKGROUND USE O

Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable

Identificador Archival:	frus:frus1969-76v21/d185
Agencia Emisora:	CIA
Fecha del Documento:	1970-11-25
Colección / Serie:	FRUS 1969–1976, vol. XXI: Chile, 1969–1973

Nota de Archivo: *Washington. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. II. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Controlled Dissem; Background Use Only.*

TDCS DB–315/06287–70

Chile/Cuba

Early November 1970

Advice by Fidel Castro to Salvador Allende Concerning His Relations With the United States and Latin America

[2 lines not declassified]

1. A Chilean diplomat, who is close to Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens, said that soon after Allende was elected President, he held a two-hour telephone conversation with Fidel Castro. The diplomat said one of the major topics discussed during the long conversation was what policy Allende would follow in his relations with the United States and Latin America. He said that Castro took advantage of the opportunity to urge Allende not to repeat the same mistakes that he, Castro, admitted he had made vis-à-vis the United States. Castro reportedly told Allende that he regretted that he had gone too far too fast in alienating the United States and said that, if he had it to do over again, he would proceed differently. Allende apparently agreed with Castro and told him that he had no intention of antagonizing the United States beyond the point of no return.

2. In addition to accepting Castro’s advice on relations with the United States, the Chilean diplomat said that Allende has given indications that he wants to try to neutralize, to the extent possible, the fears and apprehensions of the major military governments in Latin America, especially Brazil and Argentina. The diplomat speculated that Allende was leaking information about his conversation with Castro to selected high foreign officials as a tactic in his efforts to neutralize potential opposition. While Allende realizes he cannot expect the support and approval of military governments in Latin America, he is at least hopeful of avoiding their open hostility.

3. Field Dissem: None. (Also sent Santiago.)