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Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (McAfee) to the Director of Operations Policy, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Gardner)

Identificador Archival:	frus:frus1969-76v21/d354
Agencia Emisora:	Departamento de Estado
Fecha del Documento:	1973-09-14
Colección / Serie:	FRUS 1969–1976, vol. XXI: Chile, 1969–1973

Nota de Archivo: *Washington. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR/IL Historical, Chile 1973–1975. Secret.*

ARA–CIA Meeting, 14 September 1973, 11:00

ARA—Messrs. Kubisch, Shlaudeman and Amb. Bowdler; CIA—Messrs. [name not declassified] and Phillips; INR—William McAfee

The weekly ARA–DDC–DDO meeting was held this morning. Though neither side had formal agenda items to table the meeting was not without interest, since the subject was Chile.

Chile

Jack Kubisch was preparing guidelines for Dr. Kissinger on the question of how much advance notice we had on the coup. He and Dave and Jim agreed that the press play to the effect that we had clear advance notice was a misrepresentation. Jack indicated the guidelines would say that many reports of an impending coup had recently been received, that all here were aware of the possibility but that it was not accurate to say that the Government had received a clear indication that a coup was about to be triggered. Jack noted that shortly after the coup a Chilean leader told the Embassy that they had specifically decided to withhold information on the coup timing. Jack said he doubted if Dr. Kissinger would use this information, for it would reveal our close contact with coup leaders.

Dave noted reports that the new junta was considering breaking relations with the Soviets and asked for guidance in case any of their assets were questioned. Harry said we were not now in a position to give guidance without checking up the line in the Government, and suggested that if queried the Agency should simply hold off the questioner. Dave noted subsequently that their assets in various parts of the world would soon be questioned as to the US attitude toward the coup and asked that guidance be provided.

There was some discussion of the extent to which the Cubans had handled intelligence for the regime and how many Cubans were working with the government. Harry asked for information on what the attitude of Communists was and Dave said their people had been pretty well pinned down and were not in a good position to collect but would collect when able to.