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Message From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Chief of Station

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1. Now that Allende has won the election we must take another look at the situation in connection with Phase II to see if earlier suppositions, reasoning and rationale for our plans and actions are valid, partially valid or if totally new concepts pertain. In this exchange we are aware of your previous thoughts and those of the Ambassador on chances of overturning an Allende victory. What we are looking for in this message is a reaffirmation of those positions and/or your current thoughts now that Allende is the winner. The points below are based on the assumption that Alessandri has not and will not concede victory to Allende. If he concedes, we further assume that nothing can be done to influence the outcome of the congressional vote.

2. We would like you to consider at least the following questions plus any others you consider pertinent:

A. How has the utility of [name not declassified] been affected by Allende victory: does he still have some influence with Frei to encourage him to try to swing PDC votes to Alessandri? If so, is he likely to be successful on his own or would he have to be acting in name of USG? [7½ lines not declassified]

B. What is Frei's future in Phase II as result of Allende victory and poor showing by Tomic? Is he apt to act on his own to line up PDC votes for Alessandri? If not, would he be inclined to act if directly approached by Ambassador with personal request from President Nixon? What influence does Frei now have with military if he should decide coup is only way to prevent Allende inauguration? Is he likely to consider this out?

C. Again, we would be interested in your thoughts and Ambassador's on likely outcome of congressional vote even though we realize it must be speculative at this early point after election. Will radicals now consider it in their interests to support Allende instead of defecting to Alessandri per earlier forecast? How many PDC Congressmen are likely to vote for Alessandri under maximum pressure from President Frei? How many are likely to vote for Allende if Frei makes no effort at all to influence the result?

3. FYI: The 40 Committee has scheduled meeting for afternoon of 8 September to consider Chilean situation. Since we must prepare position papers for 40 Committee meeting prior this date need your reply by 1200 hours 6 September.

4. In summary we must now answer the question: "Is any form of Phase II feasible and, if so, what are prospects for success and what are the risks?" Please discuss above with the Ambassador, but we want to emphasize we do not repeat not want you to discuss these points with anyone repeat anyone outside the Embassy. Points raised in this message have

been coordinated with Deputy Assistant Secretary Crimmins.