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Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Identificador Archival:	frus:frus1969-76v21/d76
Agencia Emisora:	NSC / Casa Blanca
Fecha del Documento:	1970-09-10
Colección / Serie:	FRUS 1969–1976, vol. XXI: Chile, 1969–1973

Nota de Archivo: *Washington. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed at the top of the page.*

Chile

It is important that you focus on the attached three cables. They are as extraordinary as any I have ever seen, and they reflect a very delicate situation.

In a separate memo of September 9 I enclosed a long assessment cable from Korry (Santiago 3537) written in the first person, which expressed his conclusions that Allende could not be prevented from taking power. In the Nodis cable at Tab A (Santiago 3548) Korry says that the previous cable reflected his staff's view but not his! He implies in that cable that a convoluted political formula resting on Frei is the only hope, but his reasoning and meaning are unclear.

In the cable at Tab B (State 147740) Crimmins (ARA) asks Korry if his CAS knows what he is thinking, pointing out that we have to talk to CIA to come up with the plans you asked for and that we are confused because of his previous cable.

In the Nodis cable at Tab C (Santiago 3568) Korry says he has not taken CAS into his confidence. There is the clear hint that he is operating in some form and may be making commitments. But it is not clear what he is really doing, or what it is he really thinks. Para 5 of this cable is especially worrisome if he is "operating" in an undisguised way through third parties such as this Professor Rosenstein-Rodan or in face-to-face contact with "walk-ins" such as Alessandri's daughter. The last sentence of this cable is revealing. He is worried that he will be accused of "losing" Chile and thinks he has to do something.

I have the most uneasy instinctive feeling. His cables make Korry sound as if he is under too much stress, almost hysterical (see para 14, Tab A). I am most of all concerned that he is operating in such a way as to present us with problems, faits accomplis and perhaps most serious situations. His quarterbacking must be perceived as at least quasi-official.