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Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

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Korry's Reply to 40 Committee Cable

Attached are two cables from Korry in reply to the one we sent yesterday. Tab A is the general reply and at Tab B is a specific request.

I find Korry's answer very unsatisfactory and I believe we are now in a most delicate and difficult position. We were led to believe that there was at least a "Rube Goldberg" plan in operation. It seems evident from Korry's cable that that is not the case. He is apparently trying to construct something out of whole cloth and I submit that as an Ambassador he cannot do that without irretrievably exposing himself and the USG.

He states he has passed our message on to Frei through the Defense Minister. This is curious because his previous cables had indicated another channel had been designated by Frei to represent him. You can see from paragraph six (Tab A) that Korry is still trying to persuade people to take some political action.

Paragraph seven (Tab A) says he will implement our instructions re military contacts in a way designed to "obtain optimum political mileage and the necessary intelligence." I do not know what political mileage means but this is clearly outside of what he was instructed to do. All of paragraph seven is a remarkable paragraph.

The requests in the message at Tab B are obviously not difficult to fulfill but my question is to what end? Whom are we servicing, a Frei plan as we thought, or Korry's efforts to play kingmaker?

I believe you have to focus on this. If Korry is not reined in, we are going to be in a mess. I remind you of my memorandum of this date on mechanisms to carry out the 40 Committee's recommendations. I think it now urgent to get somebody down there to assess (a) Korry (and his stability) and (b) the situation.