DECLASSIFIED // SECRET; SENSITIVE; EYES ONLY

Memorandum for the 40 Committee

Identificador Archival:	frus:frus1969-76ve16/d56
Agencia Emisora:	NSC / Casa Blanca
Fecha del Documento:	1971-03-15
Colección / Serie:	FRUS 1969–1976, vol. E-16: Documentos sobre Chile, 1969–1973

Nota de Archivo: *Summary: This progress report summarized actions taken in Chile since January 1971 when the 40 Committee authorized $1,240,000 to support Chilean opposition parties. Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1971–72. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the first page indicates the memorandum was approved by telephone by the 40 Committee on March 22.*

Progress Report on Preparations for the April 1971 Elections, Including a PDC Request for [less than 1 line not declassified] Campaign Funds

I. Summary

This memorandum describes the actions taken by this Agency since 28 January 1971, when the Committee authorized financial support in the amount of $1,240,000 to Chilean opposition parties for the April 1971 municipal elections [less than 1 line not declassified]. This memorandum also recommends that an additional [dollar amount not declassified] be authorized for electoral support of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).

II. Background on Elections

During February, the Marxist government of Salvador Allende launched a massive drive to recruit electoral support for Popular Unity (UP) parties, particularly among lower income groups. The Communist Party's municipal election effort has been especially impressive. The Communists, who now have access to government spoils, have been spending unprecedented sums of money to recruit and pay party organizers, roving entertainment groups and sign painters to supplement the efforts of their local candidates. In addition, the Communists are participating in UP efforts to recruit and organize the Popular Unity Committees (CUP) which serve as clearing houses for government patronage and favors (ranging from handing out powdered milk to helping UP loyalists get government jobs) and which are also active in the election campaign. CUP activity is particularly intense in areas where the PDC continues to control community organizations called Neighborhood Committees created under the Frei administration. The UP has been very successful in registering the 18–21 years old who will be voting in April for the first time. In late February President Allende told a political associate that he feared the UP would only receive about 47% of the total vote, and that if his calculations are correct the UP will have a much harder task in justifying the acceleration of its program than it would if the UP were to receive more than 50%. Allende also said he had not paid sufficient attention to the elections, blaming this on his preoccupation with organizing the new government. Despite Allende's fears, the majority opinion of Chilean politicians is that the UP will gain substantially in the municipal elections and that his government may even attract a majority of the voters. Ambassador Korry estimated on 5 March that the Communist Party will poll around 20% of the vote, the Socialist Party (including its various splinter groups) about 18% and the Radical Party upwards of 10%. Considering that the other three members of the coalition will pick up something, this is not a very encouraging assessment, but it underscores the

need to bolster the opposition parties and to help them conduct electoral campaigns which will maintain the morale of their followers and evidence their continuing vitality.

III. Municipal Election Campaigns of Opposition Parties

National Party (PN)

On 28 January, the Committee authorized the passage of [dollar amount not declassified] to the PN; [3½ lines not declassified] for support to PN candidates in the municipal elections. Of this sum, [3½ lines not declassified].

The overall campaign strategy of the PN is to build its image as a party of strength, determination and will to do battle with the UP, especially the Communists. Its principal propaganda thrust is embodied in its electoral slogan “Pongase firme Junto a Un Partido Firme—El Partido Nacional” (Put Yourself Firmly Behind a Strong Party—The National Party). While the PN sees the UP as its main enemy, it continues its long-standing rivalry with the PDC, which it hopes to displace as the strongest single party in Chile. As a result of Agency prodding its leaders have made some effort to mute differences with the PDC, but its attacks on the PDC have not ended completely. The PN hopes to gain about 25% of the vote, some of which will be at the expense of the PDC.

The PN sees unemployment as one of the most important national issues of the campaign, and much of its radio advertising is pegged to unemployment and to the loss of individual liberties under the UP regime. The National Party directorate has assumed responsibility for setting the tone of the campaign, for radio advertising, for the printing of a limited number of electoral posters for each PN candidate, and for fund raising. The party is engaged in a general get-out-the-vote campaign with a special appeal to women, emphasizing the bleak future for children under a totalitarian regime. The directorate has distributed funds to each local district, with the provinces of Santiago and Concepcion receiving the highest percentages; the local districts are responsible for getting voters to the polls on election day.

The PN is making effective use of commercial radio stations and newspapers for its paid propaganda, and has also taken steps to acquire its own media capabilities. [2 lines not declassified]. The Party now controls the news content of the radio and has three political commentaries at peak listening hours. The target date for the first appearance of the new PN newspaper “La Tribuna” is 15 March.

Christian Democratic Party (PDC)

On 28 January the Committee authorized the passage of [dollar amount not declassified] to the PDC: [1½ lines not declassified] for the support of PDC candidates in the municipal campaign, and [6½ lines not declassified].

The PDC national organization has deteriorated greatly since the September presidential election and is only now being reestablished for the April campaign. Internal contradictions between the left wing of the party, led by Tomic, and the moderate faction, led by Frei, have weakened the PDC and made it vulnerable to attack from both the left and the right. In addition, the party has been badly hurt by Popular Unity Committee proselytizing among lower income groups; there are numerous sectors where PDC organizers have been shut out and party supporters are physically afraid to display PDC propaganda. A local public opinion survey with nation-wide voter preference sampling was financed by the party during February; final results are not yet in but preliminary returns give the PDC a disappointing electoral percentage.

Despite its organizational weakness, the PDC election campaign has gotten off to a vigorous start in both radio and press. The party’s major campaign theme, “Chileno, no Estas Solo” (Chilean, You are not Alone), is considered particularly effective by most observers and obviously appeals to voter uncertainty and latent fears about the Allende regime. The PDC is having difficulty in acquiring Radio Cooperativa because the Socialist Party is also competing for this nationwide radio hookup, but hopes to complete arrangements for its purchase in the very near future.

PDC leaders [1 line not declassified] and are doing their best to eliminate party feuding with opposition parties, particularly the PN.

Democratic Radical Party (PDR)

On 28 January the Committee authorized the passage of [dollar amount not declassified] to the PDR. [2 lines not declassified] and [dollar amount not declassified] for expenses in connection with the municipal election campaign. The PDR hopes to get about 140,000 votes, or approximately 6% of the national total in the municipal elections. The PDR does not plan to hold public campaign rallies but is working quietly among its supporters and relying on personal contact to stress that PR members can vote without fear in the privacy of the voting booth. PDR propaganda is emphasizing illegal land seizures, Communist strength within the Allende government, and the fact that UP policies will create hunger and unemployment. The PDR has not yet bought Radio Yungay because it and other radio stations available for sale in the Santiago area are running at an increasing monthly loss. This small party is reluctant to assume responsibility for managing a station while deeply involved in the current election campaign. Instead, the party plans to purchase campaign time on several major radio networks, and will defer its decision regarding purchase of the station until after the election.

PDR leaders have been helpful in reducing frictions between PN and PDC campaign leaders. The party campaign is properly targeted at those radical party members who defected to Alessandri during the last presidential campaign, constantly reminding them that a vote for the Radical Party signifies an endorsement of the Allende regime.

The Zaldivar Campaign

[less than 1 line not declassified] the PN withdrew its candidate, Sylvia Alessandri, from the 10th Senatorial district in favor of the PDR candidate, Jorge Ovalle. [2½ lines not declassified] thus increasing Zaldivar's chances of winning in a two way race with the UP candidate, Adonis Sepulveda. Ovalle's withdrawal is, however, unlikely unless opposition leaders are convinced that Zaldivar can win a two way race. The reason for this is that these leaders feel that most of Ovalle's votes will not be transferrable to Zaldivar; that is, Radical Party and even PN voters may be willing to vote for Ovalle [15 lines not declassified].

IV. PDC Request for [less than 1 line not declassified] Election Funds

As noted in the proposal submitted to the Committee on 28 January, the CIA Station recommended and Ambassador Korry originally concurred in an election support proposal in the amount of [4 lines not declassified]. This Agency's presentation of 28 January requested only [dollar amount not declassified] for the election campaign, of which [dollar amount not declassified] was allocated to the PDC.

On 5 March the CIA Station received a breakdown of PDC expenses through February together with projected estimates of campaign expenses for March and April. The Party believes that total campaign expenses will be about [dollar amount not declassified]. The PDC had expected that its fund raising campaign would net about [17 lines not declassified] since the party is running a strong public fund raising campaign which provides the aura of vigorous and successful fund raising. [4 lines not declassified]

Ambassador Korry and Acting Assistant Secretary of State Crimmins concur in recommending this [less than 1 line not declassified] support.

V. Recommendation

It is recommended that the 40 Committee approve the PDC's request for [less than 1 line not declassified] for the April election, bringing the [less than 1 line not declassified] authorization of funds for PDC electoral support to [dollar amount

not declassified].