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1-1-70?
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DRAFT

TO: The Secretary

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SUBJECT: Chile: Talking Points.

Early '70? late 70 early 71

IAWG DOD

I. There are a few basic points to be gotten across in the debate on Chile:

A. The establishment of a communist (Marxist-Leninist) government in Chile has not yet occurred and is not inevitable, even though the odds may be for it.

Chile under an elected Allende government is a new experience - not fully comparable to any other political experience in the world. Therefore, accurate diagnosis or prognosis is difficult. The unknown factors are many and large.

B. Short of military action, the United States has limited power to prevent Allende from achieving his objectives.

Too much of the discussion of options seems to assume that the preventive actions being considered will indeed be important factors working against Allende, when the fact is that they will not. Limitations on the Allende government must come

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mainly from within Chile, either from his government's weakness or his internal opponents' strengths.

C. But, on the other hand, the United States can contribute very considerably to Allende's success to the extent the United States' presumed preventive actions backfire to his political advantage internally and around the hemisphere.

Allende's government will have appeal internally and externally to the extent that it provides real economic and social benefits, avoids political repression, and asserts national independence. It is likely to have severe economic problems, its social gains will have a ceiling imposed by economics, and it probably will have to resort to political repression. Thus, to be politically appealing, it will logically sooner or later have to emphasize assertion of national independence. We should not help it by giving it issues.

D. As important as what happens in Chile is, more important is Chile's effect on the rest of the hemisphere.

The governments of most of the rest of the hemisphere are negatively disposed toward Allende, but are inhibited now against expressing their negative disposition not by so much by lack of United States

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leadership, as by the pervading non-interventionist philosophy of the region, concern over the possibility of appearing to be satellites of the United States, and concern over the reaction within their own countries by forces seeking change. Their position will be strengthened not by overt United States hostility to Allende, but rather by failures of Allende's internal programs, United States avoidance of the scapegoat and foreign diversion role, and relative successes of their own programs.

E. Chile is not now a large internal political issue in the United States and the predominant reaction thus far here is in favor of a correct, hands-off posture even though there is a natural desire by many to take any possible actions to weaken Allende.

F. The fact that the Allende government is democratically selected contributes strongly to the hands-off atmosphere

G. As time passes and to the extent that Allende carries out his campaign statements and is hostile toward the United States, Chile will become more of a political issue within the United States; but United States offici

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actions and attitudes which backfire in Allende's favor and give him an excuse to move closer to the USSR.will produce a worse political reaction than a United States posture which recognizes the United States' limitedcapabilities to influence events in Chile against Allende, avoids placing the United States in the scapegoat role in Chile and in the hemisphere, keeps our options open, and helps maintain our presence in Chile against the time when we may be able to have a more positive influence.

II. The foregoing points all argue for a cool, correct, wait and see approach. Some possible questions and answers regarding this approach follow:

A. Question: If the odds are heavily in favor of an Allende achieving a Marxist-Leninist government in Chile no matter what posture the United States takes, why should not our posture be negative and hostile from the beginning?

Answer: First, it is not a certainty that Allende will achieve a Marxist-Leninist government. Second, our capability - short of military or para-military action - to prevent him from doing so is very small, but our capabili

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to help him to do so through giving him juicy, foreign-devil political issues is very large. Third, likewise we can do relatively little to mobilze the rest of the hemisphere against Allende by overtly hostile action toward him, but we can help him in the rest of the hemisphere by seeming the bully.

B. Question: But Allende doesn't now show any feeling of need for foreign-devil issues.

Answer: He is preoccupied with economic issues now, but later he will discover that even the best of circumstances will not be good enough for a satisfactory economic performance, under his system. Then he will need emotional, foreign-devil issues. We should not help him by giving them to him on a silver platter.

C. Question: But he can readily manufacture them.

Answer: Yes, he can and he most certainly will. But his credibility will fade over time unless we help him by taking the initiative to provide him with issues.

D. Question: Our interventions in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic caused a big fuss for a time, but seem to be largely forgotten now; and we helped keep those governments from going communist.

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Answer: Our interventions in these two countries may have been largely forgotten here, but they have not been forgotten in Latin America. In fact, they are part of a past pattern of United States dominance that makes the most important single motivating force in Latin Ame4ica today not social and economic progress but rather the nationalistic desire for national independence - from the United States. Moreover, the story has not run out in those two countries. Communism may have only been postponed, and if it arrives our intervention at an earlier date may make it just that much harder to get rid of in the future.

E. Question: If the above answers are correct, why should we not go the other way and completely embrace Allende?

Answer: There is some argument for this approach, but it would be costly; it would be incongruous at a time when we are reducing our bilateral support for other countries; and most important, it would give a decidedly wrong message to the rest of the world regarding what we believe in. Moreover, positive U.S. action favoring Allende could help him in the short run. Finally, some negative U.S. actions will be quite understandable to Chileans and other Latin Americans because of the provocations for them.

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We are only arguing for avoidance to the extent possible of action that would give Allende helpful political issues, and for a posture that will keep us in a position to exert such influence as we can.

F. Question: Is not the State position simply that we should be prepared to live with Allende?

Answer: No. The State position is (1) that we will try to avoid helping him in Chile and in the rest of Latin America either by overt support or by giving him popular political issues; and (2) that, meanwhile, we will try to maintain such marginal influence toward limiting his progress toward his goals as we can.

G. Question: Does the State position represent a counter-punching stance?

Answer: No. We would ignore some punches and slip some where he was on a popular wicket, we would counter where we were clearly the aggrieved, and we would lead when it put us in good light or did him net harm.

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III. Some questions which might be asked of those favoring the Defense position follow:

A. Do they believe events in Chile are absolutely predictable and on an inevitable course towards Marxism-Leniam? Or do they believe that there is some room for doubt as to what may occur?

B. Do they think that the actions they are proposing would actually have a decisive affect toward limiting Allende's chances of achieving his objectives? Is it not a fact, on the contrary, that limiting forces must come mainly from within Chile?

C. Are they not concerned that actions such as hostile statements by the United States, encouragement of U.S. labor organizations to take an active role in opposing the Allende Government, the discouraging of U.S. tourism and travel to Chile, surveillance now of Chilean ships travelling the Panama Canal, and the recall now of lease/loan ships, are at best premature and, moreover, unduly risk helping Allende to obtain political support within Chile and within the hemisphere?

D. Is it not also premature to be discussing with NATO allies their need to support our Western Hemisphere

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security interests? Would we tell them that we believe the Chilean Government now to be Communist, and what would we ask them to do?

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