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EXCISE

RA26

Chile Project (#S199900030)
U.S. Department of State
Release ____ Excise ____ Deny ____
Declassify: In Part ____ In Full ____
Exemption(s) ____

Chile Project (#S199900030)
U.S. Department of State
Release ____ Excise X Deny ____ B1
Declassify: In Part X In Full ____
~~SECRET~~ Exemption(s) B1 NR NR

Dept of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Classify as (U) Extend as (S) Downgrade to
Date 3/02 Declassify on ____ Reason 1.5(c)

MEMORANDUM

May 27, 1968

TO: INR - Messrs. Hughes and Denney

FROM: INR/DDC - William C. Trueheart

SUBJECT: ARA/CIA Meeting, May 24, 1968

PARTICIPANTS: ARA - Messrs. Oliver and Sayre; CIA - 7
INR - Mr. Gardner

1.5(c)

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This page has been eliminated because it is entirely irrelevant

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Chile

Broe said that we must soon decide whether we should make any effort to influence the outcome of the 1969 Congressional and 1970 Presidential elections in Chile. Ambassador Korry and the station chief already had discussed this matter, and the Ambassador had requested that the Agency ask for 303 Committee authority to undertake a limited covert election operation aimed at the Congressional elections, which are scheduled to take place in March 1969.

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In response to the Agency's request to the station chief and the Ambassador for a detailed blueprint of a proposal for CIA action, they had produced after an outline, which, while inadequate, gave something to work with.

In effect, the Embassy proposes to operate on the basis of the CASP program, which directs that the USG must concentrate in Chile on those issues that will help prevent a government from coming in that is significantly influenced by the extreme left and to prevent if possible the election in 1969 of a Congress subject to leftwing or extremist manipulation. In pursuance of this goal the Embassy has requested consideration of a program that would cost some [redacted] to be put into a contingency fund disburseble at the Ambassador's discretion for individual candidates of the Christian Democratic. Radical, and National Parties.

[redacted]

Ambassador Korry apparently proposes to select the candidates worthy of USG support by a review and analysis program conducted by an Embassy election committee, which will decide whether a particular candidate needs help and whether, if elected, he would be able to work effectively against the current leftward current in Chilean political life.

The assistance rendered will not be given through the political parties themselves, since money so expended might well be used in support of individuals whose interests lay at variance with our own; instead, the money would go to the particular candidates themselves through very selective processes which the Embassy purports to believe could be used in a manner consistent with maximum security. Broe said that he felt that the Embassy decision to channel funds directly to individuals was a wise one and that he could see no particular problems if this method were proposed to the Agency.

Mr. Oliver remarked that he hoped our judgment as to the sort of candidates that deserve support might be broadly based. He said that he felt that he detected in Korry's correspondence and attitude a hostile to former Ambassador Tomic (who is the leading Christian Democratic hopeful for the presidential nomination and whose views are representative of the leftward elements of the Christian Democratic Party). Mr. Sayre warned that Tomic might in fact spearhead a movement in Chilean politics toward the extreme left and indicated that this was a problem that deserved very deliberate consideration.

Mr. Oliver said also that he was curious about the role that might be played by European elements, such as the [redacted] -- what were they doing, and were there any prospects that financial support by European [redacted] organizations might be forthcoming. Broe said that this was a good point.

Broe said that our biggest trouble at the moment was lack of information. The Agency was considering asking various of its European and Latin newspaper contacts for information about political temperatures in the Chilean hinterland; the sort of information in other words that our Embassy could not readily produce.

Sayre thought that a principal difficulty that we would confront in evolving a concrete program for the Chilean elections would be to get the Ambassador to be specific enough to give us a fair idea of exactly what he wanted to do and how we would go about it.

[redacted]

[redacted]

INR/DDC:JRGardner/ssj