Project (#S199900030)
Department of State
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Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
( ) Classify as (✓) Extend as (5) Downgrade to
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Best copy available
No date
but about June 1970

): J - Mr. Johnson

HROUGH: S/S

ROM: ARA - Charles A. Meyer

UBJECT: Increased USG Activity in Chilean Election

. Ambassador Korry has recommended substantive increased funding or covert political action in the pre-election and in the post-election period in Chile. The memorandum of June 22 from the agency summarizes the proposal and describes the Ambassador's justification for the increase. On June 20 we sent a series of questions to Ambassador Korry which he has answered; copies of both communications are attached.

2. Arguments in favor of proposal

1. The election of Allende as President would be strictly adverse to U.S. interests in Chile and in the rest of Latin America.

2. There is a real possibility that Alende may be elected given the forecast of a close election.

3. We should do something to try to forestall a potential

Arguments against proposal

1. Tomic and Alessandri, although better than Allende, themselves pose very serious questions for U.S. interests in Chile.

2. There is no clear prospect that Allende will win, and there is a real possibility that through the natural operations of Chilean politics he will not.

3. A decision so delicate with regard to intervention should not

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Allende victory so that, were he to win, we would be able to say we had tried our best to prevent it.

4. Although there can be no guarantee that our stepped-up campaign will be effective in avoiding an Allende election, there is a reasonable chance that it may influence a small percentage of the voters, which could be important to the expected close race.

5. According to the Agency, the proposed use of experienced and currently employed channels reduces the risks of exposure to a readily acceptable level.

be made merely to have a defense later against questions about what we did to try to prevent the election of Allende.

4. Our campaign may have no effect at all in the election.

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6. It is not clear that Allende can ride quickly and successfully over Chilean forces which would tend to restrain the establishment of a "Leninist state". Were Tomic or Allende to win and were our assistance, anti-Allende but conducted through pro-Alessandri channels, to be exposed, the cost to our relations with them would be very great. Our ability to influence the post-election situation would be reduced to the minimum. The leftist picture of the USG as dedicated to manipulation would be confirmed with serious effects in Latin America and elsewhere.

7. If we are to be faithful to the prescriptions of general policy, we should leave to the Chileans the protection of their own interests threatened by an Allende win. We should not do for them what they are unwilling to do for themselves. There is no real lack of money or organizational